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THE LAW OF COOPERATIVE MARKETING ASSOCIATIONS
Ten years ago, the law that affected Cooperative Marketing
Association was somewhat chaotic. In a few states, such as
Kentucky, Indiana, Alabama, there were a series of sympathetic
court decisions under which certain types of Cooperatives could
thrive.
In other states there was a distinct antagonism toward Cooperative Marketing activities. In Iowa, the famous cases,
Reeves v. Decorah Society, 140 N. W. 844, and Ludowese v.
Farmers' Cooperative Go., 145 N. W. 475, announced that contracts between Cooperative Associations and their own members binding the members to deliver their specified products to
the association and assessing liquidated damages in the event
of a breach, were invalid and contrary to sound public policy.
In Colorado, the case of Burns v. Wray, 176 Pac. 487, announced a similar doctrine and paralyzed the development of
effective Cooperatives in the Mountain States.
These decisions had much to do with the growth of Cooperative activity among the farms into purely local organizations, excellent in their way but wholly incapable of solving the
fundamental problems of marketing farm products.
Small cooperative Associations be!ame common for making
butter or cheese, as in Minnesota or Wisconsin; but they failed
to federate for marketing purposes on any large scale.
Local grain groups built elevators to act as a local commission house, owned by the farmers and distributing patronage
dividends from their profits, when there were any.
For years the Middle West was cramped into the local
style by both economic and legal binders-and the system
seemed fixed forever by the limitations of legal rights as
announced by the courts.
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In the far West, however, a new interpretation of farmers'
marketing associations had been announced. The fruit growers
of California had been experimenting with various types of
Cooperation and had failed so often and renewed the attempts
after studies of their failures that they were bound to find
the light.
Without realizing that they were discovering a principle,
these fruit growers had organized local associations to pack and
standardize fruit; and then these associations had federated
into an exchange for the actual marketing of the fruit. The
growers handled through their organization only related fruits,
such as oranges and lemons. With the raisin growers, there
were no locals but only a single central association which packed
raisins at the most convenient points-not at each local centerand therefore had no need for locals.
This was organization by the commodity in contrast to
organization by locality. They thought in terms of the commodity only--of merchandising the commodity just as great soap
manufacturers or typewriter makers merchandisQ a single
commodity.
The farmers in the far West had somehow stumbled on the
realization that they were not helpless under the sacred law of
the economists, the law of supply and demand. They found the
movable factors in that law-time and place; and they learned
that the most important element in making price was not the
mere statistical position of supply or demand but the ability to
adjust supply to demand at any given time in any given place.
This adjustment could not be made by a single farmer;
nor by a local association or even a small group of locals. But
it could be made by farmers who could control and be certain
of the control of a large percentage of the commodity and could
help guide the flow of that commodity into the markets of
the world.
So the commodity idea was developed and finally announced. In its train it drew along the necessity for a binding
contract. If packing houses were to be erected there had to be
a certainty of paying for them and of maintaining them. If
commodity cooperatives were to advertise and sell fruit, often
in advance of delivery by the farmers, they had to be sure that
the farmers would deliver.
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So the binding contract developed; and obligations and
rights of various kinds grew along with the contracts.
The inevitable happened. Law began to conform slowly
to the economic advance. The farmers had found a definite
trend; and law put flesh on its dry bones and grew again in the
same measure.
These commodity associations were large and powerful.
Sometimes they were the very largest factors in the entire industry, such as the Associated Raisin Company, the California Fruit
Growers' Exchange, the California Walnut Growers' Exchange.
They were so important that some could actually name the
price of the commodity, just as the great manufacturers of
other wares make and change their prices from time to time.
The Walnut Growers' Exchange dominated the market for
domestic walnuts; named the prices for graded walnuts. Of
course, these exchanges tried to exercise their powers wisely.
Good merchants in any line do not gouge the public but fix
prices high enough to make a profit and low enough to keep
down any intensive increases in production.
Among good merchants profits must justify their staying
in business but must discourage others from abandoning their
own activities to get into the apparently favored field.
Nevertheless, all men are not good merchants; and the
public has not put its faith in the wisdom of good merchandising
alone. The public demanded and secured strong anti-trust
legislation, both Federal and State, to curb monopolies and
prevent price-making abuses and to throttle organizations or
combinations formed for the purpose of bettering prices or
restraining trade.
These commodity organizations were combinations of
farmers organized frankly to minimize speculation; to stabilize
markets; to get more money for the farmers without necessarily
increasing price to the consumer. The history of the California
Fruit Growers' Exchange has demonstrated that such a commodity organization could and did increase the return to the
farmer more than 300% and, in the same period, actually
decreased the average cost of oranges to the retail trade and the
consumer.
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But in other instances, an increase to the farmer has coincided with an increase, slight or large, to the consumer, notably
in the prices of raisins in the period from 1919 to 1922.
This power to affect prices through commodity organizations, whenever they came into control by contract over any
large proportion of a commodity, made conflicts inevitable. The
great distributors, the powerful packers, began to fight against
these farmer organizations. They tried to get actions started
for violation of anti-trust laws. They worked, in a far more
skillful way, to break up the associations by persuading members to break their contracts, by dissatisfying them with the
cooperatives, by open warfare or secret, depending on the
natural tendencies of the antagonists.
It was soon found that the easiest way to destroy a cooperative was to spread tales about the managers and their policies.
Cooperatives of the right type are exactly like democracies-and
they have the faults as well as the virtues of democracies.
Many members feel that they can ran the cooperative as
well as a trained manager and at much less expense, just as
many citizens feel themselves eminently fitted to instruct the
nation on all sorts of political issues without any training or
perceptible study whatsoever.
There is always a fertile field for rumors in a cooperativepreferably ugly, personal rumors. They go fast and they grow
in the going. Soon the cooperative spirit is frozen, just as
depositors lose faith and start runs on the bank, when rumors
fly about on black wings.
The next easiest way to destroy a cooperative is to pay good
prices to the non-cooperator and to buy from the cooperative
only when the outside products are all exhausted.
Then if there is the least carryover, the cooperative must
carry it; and on that part of the crop itf may distribute to the
grower-members only what it has borrowed thereon-but no
Ilnal sale-price.
Thus the outsider often gets a better return for his crop
than the cooperative member; and he boasts of it to the cooperator to indicate his superior marketing wisdom. He does not
realize that he has sold himself along with his prunes or his
tobacco and he does not seem to see that, were it not for the
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existence of the cooperative, neither he nor the cooperators
could have received the prices they finally did get.
This causes bitter dissatisfaction; and frequently the impatient member wants to become an outsider and he chafes at
his contract.
Then a few dealers sometimes are bold enough to suggest
to members that they break their contracts and sell the product
to the dealers, under an agreement by which the dealer will pay
more than the association price, whatever it may be; and protect
the member from any cost or loss by reason of actions against
him for breach of contract.
These and other reasons led to much litigation, within and
by the cooperatives. Many members would become dissatisfied
for justifiable reasons and then, without legal justification, break
their contracts, before attempting to remedy the situation by
changes of management or otherwise.
The legal background was confused even in states where
the judicial trend seemed favorable to farmer organizations.
For example, it was soon recognized that liquidated damages
would be inadequate where a grower agreed to deliver all the
eggs produced by his hens and the cooperative association, relying on this agreement, sold a reasonable quantity of eggs for
future delivery. Equitable relief would be the only satisfactory
remedy to enjoin the grower from selling to any outside commission merchant and to compel him to give specific performance of his contract. Yet in ,California, where this idea was
first developed, we were unsuccessful in establishing the doctrine
because of a statutory code provision which appeared to limit
these associations to liquidated damages.
Under the stress of economic pressure and legal confusion,
it seemed best to try to anticipate and settle most of the legal
difficulties by' statute and to fix the trend of legislation which
would in turn fix the trend of court decisions.
In Federal Legislation, the farmer groups desired the same
kind of exemption from anti-trust laws that was generally accorded to labor unions. Section 6 of the Clayton Act grants a
kind of exemption and seems to indicate that a cooperative
association may be organized, without capital stock and without
any aim of profit for itself, and be exempt from attack as to its
form of organization, its existence as a combination of growers.
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But there is apparently no exemption here from any abuse of
power by such an organization, even where its form of organization is held proper.
Then the Capper-Volstead Act (1922) made the exemption
far more specific and indicated bluntly that these Cooperative
Associations could fix prices and might sometimes try to abuse
that power. If so, a remedy was set forth under which complaint may be made and the Secretary of Agriculture may
order the price reduced; and, if the Association fails to obey, he
may cause its dissolution.
This is the only instance in our legislative history, where
any industry not public in character and not acting under a
war-crisis, voluntarily suggested and accepted against itself the
right of any governmental officer to control and curb its pricemaking power.
There are also recorded certain exemptions from income
taxes and other small bits of legislation, all tending to show a
desire on the part of the Federal Government to aid and
encourage cooperative marketing. The last bit of legislation
was the Haugen Bill (1926), which authorized the Secretary of
Agriculture to set up a Bureau of Cooperative Marketing within
the Department and to carry on rather extended activities as
to investigations and conferences and dissemination of information.
Generally speaking, Federal Legislation has been exemptive
in character, shielding the Farmers' Associations from part of
the anti-trust laws and from income taxes-and by these pronouncements, the Federal Government has indicated a clear
policy of encourfgement for cooperative marketing.
It is significant to note that, in these days when combinations of industrial units seem to be so desirable economically,
the farmers are the only great producers of actual commodities
who may form the tightest type of combination, for both domestic and foreign trade, without interference of law by reason of
the form or fact of organization.
There is a reason to justify this; the peculiar character of
agricultural industry is individual in production whereas other
industries are characterized by group production.
If a price is forced out of line in an industry built on individual production, every man extends his acreage or goes newly
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into that commodity and inevitable overproduction follows and
swamps the industry. Exactly this did happen with the great
Raisin Growers' Company in the last four years. Thus, there
is an automatic protection to the public and a constant threat
to the growers themselves if they abuse their power through
organization.
With group production industries there is no such automatic protection. If a steel trust raises the price of steel rails
beyond conscience, very few can flock into the business. Too
much capital is there required. Therefore there is regulation
by law in all group production industries.
Thus Federal legislation cleared the way for effective
organization of commodity cooperatives.
Then the attempt -was made to codify the legal experiences
of cooperative associations, to prepare a standard law which
would define the powers of cooperatives; their method of organization; internal control; limitations of membership; types of
contracts they might make; enforcement of such contracts with
both legal and equitable remedies; protection of such contracts
by providing for penalties for those who urge members to break
them; exemption from local anti-trust statutes and certain local
taxes; extension of these rights by comity to cooperatives organized under similar laws in other states.
This was a deliberate attempt to settle by statute matters
which had been argued for years before many courts, with varying primary decisions and some variance even in appellate
courts.
The act was first adopted in Texas in 1921. But the best
form of the act is the Bingham Cooperative Marketing Act of
Kentucky, adopted early in 1922. This act contains the
announcement of public policy and, among other things, sets
forth in Section 5 the reason for the encouragement of farmer
combinations because of the peculiar nature of the industry.
Section 1 of the Bingham Act reads:
"Declaration of Policy.
(a)
In order to promote, foster and encourage the intelligeni
and orderly marketing of agricultural products through cooperation;
and to eliminate speculation and waste; and to make the distribution
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of agricultural products between producer and consumer as direct as
can be efficiently done; and to stabilize the marketing of agricultural
products, this Act is passed."

Section 5 reads:
"Preliminary Investigation.
Every group of persons contemplating the organization of an association under this act is urged to communicate with the Dean of the
College of Agriculture of the University of Kentucky, who will inform
them whatever a survey of the marketing conditions affecting the
commodities proposed to be handled may indicate regarding probable
success.
It is here recognized that agriculture is characterized by individual
production in contrast to the group or factory system that characterizes other forms of industrial production; and that the ordinary form of corporate organization permits industrial groups
to combine for the purpose of group production and the ensuing group
marketing and that the public has an interest in permitting farmers
to bring their industry to the high degree of efficiency and merchandising skill evidenced in the manufacturing industries; and that the
public interest urgently needs to prevent the migration from the farm
to the city in order to keep up farm production and to preserve the
agricultural supply of the nation; and that the public interest
demands that the farmer be encouraged to attain a superior and more
direct system of marketing in the substitution of merchandising for
the blind, unscientific and speculative selling of crops; and that for
this purpose, the farmers should secure special guidance and instructive data from the Dean of the College of Agriculture of the University
of Kentucky."

Within a period of five years, Cooperative Marketing Acts
generally similar to the Kentucky or Texas Cooperative Marketing Acts have been adopted, with certain variations, in over
forty states of the Union:
Alabama: Laws of Alabama Special Session 1921, No. 31, approved
Oct. 29, 1921.
Arizona: Session Laws of Arizona 1921, Chapter 156, approved March
22, 1921.
Arkansas: General Acts of Arkansas, 1921, Act 116, approved Feb.
14, 1921.
California:
Laws of California, 1923, Chapter 103, approved May

4, 1923.
Colorado:
Session Laws of Colorado, 1923, Chapter 142, approved
March 30, 1923.
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Connecticut: Public Acts of Connecticut, 1923, Chapter 251, approved
June 1. 1923.
(Contract and enforcement clauses; protective
provisions).
Ifiorida: Laws of Florida, 1923, Chapter 9300, approved June 7, 1923.
Georgia: Laws of Georgia, 1921, No. 279, approved Aug. 15, 1921.
Idaho:
Session Laws of Idaho, 1921, Chapter 124, approved Feb.
25, 1921.
Illinois: Laws of Ilinois, 1923, p. 286 (Senate Bill 165) (Smith Hurd
111. Revised Statutes, Chapter 32, Sections 440-472), approved
June 21, 1923.
Indiana: General Laws of Indiana, Acts of 1925, Chapter 20, approved
Feb. 23 1925.
Iowa: Laws of Iowa, 1921 (41), G. A. Chapter 122, approved April 5,
1921 (enforcement clauses only).
Kansas:
Laws of Kansas, 1921, Chapter 148, approved March
21, 1921.
Kentucky: Acts of Kentucky, 1922, Chapter 1, approved Jan. 10, 1922.
Louisiana:
Acts of Louisiana, 1922, Act No. 57 approved July
13, 1922.
Maine: P'ublic Laws of Maine, 1923, Chapter 88, approved March
24, 1923.
Maryland:
Laws of Maryland, 1922, Chapter 197 (Code of Public
General Laws of Maryland, Art. 23, Sections 469 to 496), approved
April 13, 1922.
Massachusetts: Acts of Massachusetts, 1923, Chapter 438, Section 4,
approved May 23, 1923.
(General Laws, Mass. Chap. 157,. See.
1018. Not standard contract provisions; enforcement clauses; a
few protective provisions).
Minnesota:
Laws of Minnesota, 1923, Chapter 264, approved April
16, 1923.
Mississippi: Laws of Mississippi, 1922, Chapter 179, approved March
28, 1922.
Missouri: Laws of Missouri, 1923 (C. S. H. B. 439), page 111, approved April 9, 1923.
Montana:
Laws of Montana, 1921, Chapter 233, approved March
5, 1921.
Nqebraska:
Session Laws of Nebraska, 1925, Chapter 79, approved
March 13, 1925.
Nevada: Statutes of Nevada, Chapter 236, approved March 23, 1921.
New Hampshire: Laws of New Hampshire, 1925, Chapter 33, approved
March 19, 1925.
New Jersey: Laws of New Jersey, 1924, Chapter 12, approved Feb.
28, 1924.
New Mexico: Laws of New Mexico, 1925, Chapter 99, approved March
17, 1925.
New York:
Laws of New York, 1924, Chapter 616, approved May
5, 1924.
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North Carolina: Public Session Laws of North Carolina, 1921, Chapter
89, approved March 7, 1921.
North Dakota:
Session Laws of North Dakota, 1921, Chapter 44,
approved March 10, 1921.
Ohio: Laws of Ohio, 1923, Page 91, approved April 13, 1923. Ohio
G. C., Sections 10136-1 to 30.
Oklahoma: Session Laws of Oklahoma, 1923, Chapter 131, approved
March 19, 1923.
Oregon: Laws of Oregon, 1915, Chapter 226; 1917, Chapter 411; 1921,
Chapter 490.
South Carolfna:
Acts of South Carolina, 1921, No. 203, approved
March 29, 1921.
13outh Dakota: Laws of South Dakota, 1923, Chapter 15, approved
Feb. 27, 1923.
Tennessee:
Public Acts of Tennessee, 1923, Chapter 100, approved
March 31, 1923.
Texas: General Laws of Texas, 1921, Chapter 22, approved March
1, 1921.
Utah: Laws of Utah, 1923, Chapter 6, approved Feb. 8, 1923.
virginia: Acts of Assembly of Virginia, 1922, Chapter 48, approved
Feb. 18, 1922.
Wasnington:
Session Laws of Washington, 1921, Chapter 115,
approved March 18, 1921.
West Virginia: Acts of West Virginia, 1923, Chapter 53, approved
May 2, 1923.
Wisconsin: Wisconsin Statutes, 1921, Section 1736, el-17a (contract
clauses; Unforcement clauses; many protective provisions).
Wyoming: Session Laws of Wyoming, 1923, Chapter 83, approved
March 1, 1923.

This Act has established the primary legal principles of
Cooperative Marketing. We now have a fairly clear idea of
-what a cooperative may do; how it may enforce its contracts;
how it may protect itself from unfair commercial war.
We know the limitations of cooperatives-that they cannot
in many states, handle .a pound of produce for a non-member
and in certain others, may handle for non-members any amount
equal to the aggregate amounts delivered by their members.
Each member has one vote and democratic control is enforced
by law. Annual reports are compulsory and some opportunity
is afforded to check the cooperative management as to efficiency.
But primarily, the trend of law was set and a public policy
clearly announced.
This type of law has been upheld in many jurisdictions, the
most important decisions being:
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Kentffcky-Potter vs. Dark Tobacco Growers' Coop. Assn. (1923) 201
Ky. 441, 257 S. W. 33.
Indiana-Burley Tobacco Growers' Coop. Assn. vs. Rogers (1926) 150
N. E. 384.
1JarX Tobacco Growers' Coop. Assn. vs. Robertson (1926) 150
N. E. 106.
Ohlo-List vs. Burley Tobacco Growers' Coop. Assn. (1926) 151 N.
E. 471.
Tennessee-Dark Tobacco Growers' Coop. Assn. vs. Dunn (1924)
266 S. W. 308.
Dark Tobacco Growers' Coop. Assn. vs. Mason (1924) 263 S.
W. 60.
Alabama-Warren vs. Alabama Farm Bureau Cotton Assn. (1925)
104 So. 264.
Colorado-Rifle Potato Growers' Coop. Assn. vs. Smith. (1925) 240
P. 397.
Georgia-Harrell vs. Cane Growers' Coop. Assn. (1925) 126 S. E. 531.
Kansas-Kansas Wheat Growers' Assn. vs. Schulte (1923) 216 P. 311.
Louisiana-Louisiana Farm Bureau Cotton Growers' Assn. vs. Clark
(1926) 107 So. 115.
MRlinnesota-Ainnesota Wheat Growers' Cooperative Marketing Assn.
vs. Huggins (1925) 203 N. W. 420.
Mississippi-Brown vs. Staple Cotton Coop. Assn. (1923) 96 So. 849.
Nebraska-Nebraska Wheat Growers' Assn. vs. Norquest (1925) 204
N. W. 798.
North Carolina-Tobacco Growers' Cooperative Assn. vs. Jones (1923)
117 S. E. 174.
Texas-Texas Farm Bureau Cotton Assn. v. Stovall (1923) 253 S.
W. 1101.

It has been held constitutional in every instance, except in
the Clark case where the Act generally wag held valid but one
clause, providing for a conclusive presumption that the landlord
controls the products raised on his farm, was held unconstitutional; and in one Minnesota case, Minnesota Wheat Growers'
Assn. v. Radke, (1925) 204 N. W. 314, where only the protective

provision against dealers or warehousemen, who try to persuade
or permit members to breach their contracts by sales to them,
was declared unconstitutional.
As a matter of special local interest, the Kentucky Court
of Appeals directly upheld both of these provisions-Feagaii v.
Dark Tobacco Growers' Coop. Assn. (1924) 261 S. W. 607 and
(a) Dark Tobacco Growers' Coop. Assn. v. Daniels (1926) 284
S. W. 399; (b) Liberty Warehouse Co. v. Burley Tobacco Growers' Cooperative Assn. (1925) 271 S. W. 695.
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The same Court of Appeals, in a well-reasoned decision,
Burley Tobacco Growers' Cooperative Assn. v. City of Carrollton, Ky., (1925) 270 S. W. 749, declared invalid the tax exemption contained in Section 31 of the Kentucky Act. This provision was unique; and differed from the usual tax-exemption
clause found in the standard act.
Nowhere else has that exemption been disturbed.
Thus the basic law seems to be established. A new public
policy has been proclaimed and has been universally followed.
In the Potter case, 257 S. W. 33, the Kentucky Court of
Appeals recognized, with breadth of vision and telling force,
the effect on law of the new economic development; and we
quote at pardonable length:
"The basis of this change in public opinion toward combination
and classification is not in any sense political, but economic rather,
and, in our judgment, it is because of basic economic conditions, affecting vitally not only the farmers, but also the public weal, that the
classification based upon agricultural pursuits is reasonable, just, and
imperative for the good of the entire nation and every citizen thereof,
If this be true, the Bingham. Act is based upon a classification that is
not offensive to the equal protection provisions of the Fourteenth
Amenament.
The fact that other productive groups can, do, and for many years
have marketed their wares as groups, and not as individuals, and
that they are and have been enabled through group organization or
'gentlemen agreements' to regulate the distribution and stabilize the
prices of their products, is a fact known of all men which can neither
be denied nor blinked by the courts; as is also the fact that farmers,
if unorganized, necessarily act as individuals and not as groups in
marketing their products, resulting in 'dumping' by the farmers,
distribution by speculators, and unconscionable and uneconomic spread
between producer and consumer in the necessities of life and an
inevitable demoralization of basic economic conditions to the hurt
directly or indirectly of every citizen.
With a clear recognition of this fact borne in upon the public
conscience by the threatened economic collapse of the farming industry indispensable to' public welfare and national stability, if not
national existence, an enlightened public opinion unmistakenly demands that farmers be permitted to organize for the marketing of
their crops, not merely for their own protection, but for the public good.
But what has current public opinion with reference to economic questions to do with constitutional inhibitions and guaranties? Just this:
It often, as here, affords the proper and usual approach for a consideration of their terms and meaning.
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That all law, even constitutional law, it not static, but progressive,
and in step always with sound economic conditions and an enlightened
public policy, recently has come to be realized clearly, if ever it may
have been thought otherwise, as is attested by highest judicial and lay
utterances.
The best evidence of the sure foundation of the federal Constitution, is not that it was declaratory of the highest conceptions of truth
and justice with reference to community life when it was written, but
that, correctly interpreted, it is equally so today, despite the many
changes time and experience have brought in such conceptions. The
Constitution in the Fourteenth Amendment declared the public policy
of equal protection of the laws, unalterably, both then and now, it is
true, except by formal amendment, but, being written for time rather
than a day, most wisely left it to the Legislatures and the courts to
provide the means and define the terms in accordance with an enlightened public consciousness which continually strives toward, and constantly attains, if but slowly and haltingly, a better understanding of
community life. Unquestionably, as that complex problem is understood by the best thought of today, the Bingham Act, by enabling the
farmers to market their crops cooperatively for the purpose, as
declared in the act of regulating distribution and stablizing the prices
of farm products, serves a pressing public need that justifies the classification of farmers as a distinct class, and treats all of the class equally
and fairly, and not better, if that were important, than other distinct
productive classes are treated under the laws of the state and nation.
It does not, therefore, offend the equal protection provisions of the
federal Constitution, notwithstanding the fact that 21 years ago the
Supreme Court of the United States in the case of Connolly vs. Union
Sewer Pipe Co. supra, indicated a somewhat contrary view, but which
is, under the more recent decisions of that court, easily distinguished
upon several grounds."

This view has been generally approved and frequently
cited, and the Appellate Courts have almost universally given a
liberal interpretation to all of the provisions of these Marketing Acts.

In addition to this standard act, there have been bits of
auxiliary legislation tending to establish protection for the
farmers in their cooperative or other activities, particularly in
contact with warehousemen or crop lien holders.
For example, in Virginia and Kentucky, acts were passed
to regulate warehousemen and to cause them to record and disclose the true names of the owners of tobacco sold upon their
auction floors. These acts were attackecd but held valid in

Reaves Warehouse Corporation v. Commonwealth, Virginia
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(1925) 126 S. E. 87; Jewel Tobacca Warehouse Co. v. Kemper,
Kentucky( 1925)2 68 S .W. 324.
In Maine, an elaborate statute was passed, to provide that
the crops of growers, members of a cooperative marketing association, against which crop liens had been placed after the
grower had become a member of the Association and after the
Association had duly recorded his name in the county as a
member under such contractual obligations, must be delivered
to the Association in accordance with, the terms of the contract,
and that the lien would then follow the proceeds due such
member instead of following the products themselves.
This law, as such, has not yet been passed upon by any
court of last resort.
Judicial opinion has been steadily upholding both the basic
statute and the Associations organized thereunder and the contracts made by such AssoQiations.
It was inevitable that much litigation would follow cooperative organization even under a standard law. First, there was
a new relationship to be established toward the public. A new
public policy was announced. The State became the encourager
of Cooperation. The public generally was concerned, sometimes as consumers, sometimes as creditors, sometimes as dealers,
always as citizens.
Everywhere the cooperatives have been held in. line with the
best public policy.
Only once has any state official openly attacked a cooperative in points involving public policy.
The Attorney General of Tennessee started an action described as follows in an opinion, State of Tennessee ex rel Thomp-on v. Burley Tobacco Growers' Coop. Assn., Court of Appeals,
Tenn., 1926:
"The bill in this cause was brought by the State of Tennessee, on
relation of its Attorney General, under Section 3188 of Shannon's
Annotated Code, against the Burley Tobacco Growers' Cooperative Assnciation, a corporation chartered under and by virtue of the Bingham
Cooperative Marketing Act of Kentucky (Acts of Kentucky, 1922,
Chapter 1), for the purpose of inhibiting it from transacting its business in Tennessee upon the ground that the business in which it is
engaged and which it proposed to transact, constitutes it an unlawful
trust and combination, violative of the provisions of the anti-trust
statutes of Tennessee compiled in Section 3185 of Shannon's Annotated
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Code. At the time of the filing of the bill the Chancellor granted a
preliminary injunction upon ex parte application. Several motions
were made to dissolve this injunction but this was denied; except
that the Association was pdrmitted to perform all contracts made by
It with farmers in Tennessee prior to the issuance of the injunction
and to use, as incident thereto, any warehouse owned or to be built
by it, to buy or rent other warehouses such as it might deem proper
for storing, handling and selling tobacco purchased by it or to be
received by it under contracts made by it prior to the issuance of the
injunction.
Upon the hearing, upon a voluminous record, the Chancellor sustained the bill, holding that the defendant Association was an unlawful
combination in restraint of trade, existing and operating in violation
of the anti-trust statutes, and, therefore he rendered a decree perpetually enjoining said defendant from doing business in Tennessee.
From this decree the Association, and certain of its officers and agents,
who were made co-defendants, have appealed."

The final conclusion of this Court of Appeals was:
"In the last analysis this controversy turns upon the question of
public policy. While the police powers of the state may be exerted
uncler the statutes, with reference to economic problems, there is much
danger of transcending the power thus given, in order to interfere
with contractual relations and situations of a purely business character. Whether the cooperative marketing system is or not economically beneficial is not primarily a judicial question. As an economic
question it may be dealt with governmentally by the legislative department. The legislature has manifestly treated as a favored class,
persons engaged in agriculture, as they are so widely scattered and
compose so numerous a class that it Is a physical and enconomic impossibility to combine them all in any commercial enterprise. Many
of them are very small producers of such limited means that they
must market their products immediately after harvesting and are
therefore at the mercy of purchasers without any voice whatever in
making prices or terms. Merchants and manufacturers are not of
such character nor are they so situated. Recognizing the apparent
necessity of cooperative marketing of farm products, the legislatures
of at least two-thirds of the states and the Congress of the United
States have enacted statutes legalizing the system, and not only have
these statutes been held constitutional, but the standard marketing
contracts made by Associations with their members have been held
valid and enforceable in a long line of cases so numerous that we
vill not undertake to cite them. Most of them will be found in the
Notes in 25 A. L. Ri. p. 1090, and 33 A. L. R. p. 247. Later cases, in
addition to those already cited herein, are: Burley Tobacco Growers'
Cooperative Association vs. Rogers (Ind.) 150 N. E. 384; Dark
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Tobacco Growers' Cooperative Association vs. Robertson (Ind.) 150
N. E. 106; Rifle Potato Growers' Association vs. Smith (Colo.) 240
k'ac. 937.
Upon a careful consideration of all of the facts presented in the
large record in this case, we are unable to agree with the conclusions
of law or fact reached by the Chancellor as grounds for sustaining
the bill in this cause. We do not think that the Association in question
has practiced unreasonable restraint of trade, fraudulent rivalry or
coercion, illegal suppression of competition, undue limitation of production, impairment of quality, decreasing wages or prices of materials; or that it is manifest that such will be the probable effect of the
operation of the Association.
The evidence in the case before us fails, in our opinion, to meet
the requirements set forth in the foregoing rules. These requirements
are applicable to a proceeding to deprive a foreign corporation, duly
licensed, from further doing business within the State of Tennessee.
We have disposed of this case with the greatest respect for the
late Attorney General, for his learning, ability, zeal and his sincere
motives in instituting this proceeding; but we are unable to hold upon
this r~cord that this association should be inhibited from further
carrying on a system of cooperative marketing of Burley tobacco.
Whatever may be the practices of the Association in the future, neither
it nor the Tennessee farmers favorable to it have, -in our opinion,
become subject to be deprived of its right to do business in Tennessee.
The decree of the Chancellor is reversed, the injunction is dissolved
and the bill is dismissed. The costs are adjudged against the State.
The Clerk will certify the bill of costs to the Comptroller for payment."

The only other instance, within my knowledge, where an
Attorney General directly attacked a cooperative association,
was in California where an action was very properly brought

against a Dairy Cooperative to inquire, under quo warranto
proceedings, why it was using its funds to go into the ice busihess without particular authority in its charter.
Other than this Tennessee experience, there are no attacks
on the Cooperatives from the standpoint of policy, except wherq

they arise incidentally as part of the conflict with speculative
dealers or as a desperate defense urged by some grower who
seeks to evade the obligation of his own contract.

All the recent

decisions, particularly the List case (Ohio), Rogers aind Robertson cases (Indiana), Dunn and Mason cases (Tennessee), Potter
case (Kentucky), all cited above, are of one accord in approval
of the new public policy.

Several of these cases, notably the
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List, Potter and Dunn cases, go specifically into the famous
Connolly case (Connolly v. Union Sewer Pipe Co. 22 U. S. Sup.
Ct. 431), the standby of those who argue for the old public policy
and the old refusal to permit classification of the farmers as a
group separate and distinct from other industrial groups in a
legal sense.
Besides this public relationship the Cooperatives have had.
to work out their relations with their members.
The modern commodity cooperatives bear a dual relationship here. The grower is a member; and as a member he has
certain rights, such as voting, and certain specific obligations.
Separately, he is a contract-party with the Association on
his marketing agreement. He coud not, in some states, become
a contract-party without first being a member; but in every instance, the relationships are separate. He may cease to be a
contract-party when the term of his agreement expires; but he
does not thereby cease to be a member.
He may no longer have to deliver his cotton, or his tobacco;
but he may have the right to vote for directors, unless and
until he withdraws or is dropped from membership.
He may have a financial interest in the Association by
reason of his right in the membership fund; or perhaps by his
rights in the reserve. But even here, we must distinguish, because his rights in the reserve are rights as a contract-party,
arising out of deductions from the gross proceeds of the sale of
products under his marketing contracts.
On these problems, the law is being made very slowly. But
it is being made with great definiteness on his rights or obligations as a contract-party.
There are various kinds of cooperative contracts-some set
out solely in by-laws, which is an undesirable and awkward type
of contract; some in separate documents executed with a recog-)
nition that rights as a contract-party are separate from rights
as a member.
These contracts may be firm for a term of years, as the
Burley Tobacco contracts; or a long term, firm for one or two
years but with a right of withdrawal thereafter annually; or
one year contracts to be renewed annually by signature; or
term or perpetually self-renewing contracts, presumed to be
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renewed each year, unless notice to the contrary is given by a
certain date.
These contracts may be agency contracts or contracts in
which title passes to the cooperative. In the latter class, the
favorite type is the sale and re-sale contract, in which no definite
sale-price is named but a definite method for ascertaining price
is set forth.
There is no space here to analyze the decisions on these
various types of contracts. It will suffice to state that the
cooperative contracts are now almost universally upheld, both
from the statutory authority and from a common-law basis, as
the Potter case indicates.
In Iowa, the effect of the old Reeves and Ludowese casel
has been swept away by the recognition of a new public policy
in Clear Lake Coop. Assn. v. Weir, Iowa 1925, 206 N. W. 297.
In Colorado, the decision of Burns v. Wray has become ancient
law in view of the Rifle case.
There are slight differences between courts; but, as a
whole, the decisions have made enforcement of cooperative contracts relatively easy througbcut the land.
Certain cases, such as the Stovall case in Texas, Brown
case in Mississippi, Jones case in North Casolina, Robertson case
in Indiana, are exceedingly interesting for their statements on
the technical problems in contracts.
They can be read profitably for their discussions and their
approval of the remedies set out in the statutes, both legal and
equitable.
On the other hand, there is a decision in Oklahoma, Oklahoma Cotton Growers' v. Salyer, Okla. 1925, 243 p. 232, which
not only denies relief on the marketing contract under a peculiar
set of facts but also sets up a decision on liquidated damages,
which seems to run contrary to the logic of all courts in the
United States or in Canda that have passed on this issue in
Cooperative cases. I here also suggest that scholars will find
much interest in the discussions on public policy, restraint of
trade, liquidated damages in the case of Saskatchewan Coop.
Wheat Producers Ltd. v. Zurowski (1926) 3 D. L. R. 810, in
which the famous Canadian wheat pools modeled after our own
commodity associations, maintained its standard contract in the
highest court in Saskatchewan, particularly on the liquidated
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damage clause which was written by the same hand and in
substantially the same terms as the Burley Tobacco contract
enforcement clause.
There are still some differences between the courts as to
enforcement of contracts against tenants with notice; as against
transfers to wives or sons; as against bankers or others holding
crop mortgages.
In these problems, the courts of Kentucky, Kansas and
Texas have been most effective in aiding the cooperatives to
maintain the integrity and priority of their contracts as against
all manner of attempted conveyances or subordination of rights.
The Kansas Wheat Growers' Association decisions are cited as
the leading decisions, where bank mortgages are concerned; the
Texas Cotton -Association decisions share with the Kentucky
groups the distinction of being cited most often as to rights or
obligations of landlords.
One of the most recent expressions of law in this connection is the case of Dark Tobacca Growers' Cooperative Association v. Daniels (Ky. 1926), 284: S. W. 399, in which the court
declares:
"'-rle landlord could rent or lease his land and could thus control
the sale and delivery of crops, and had the power by stipulation to
ieserle to himself the right to have tobacco or any other crop produced on his land sold or delivered upon a certain market or to a
certain person or association. The marketing agreement and Bingham
Act must be construed as a part of every rental contract or lease of
Jands for the purpose of raising farm products which the member
makes with reference to land owned by him or in which he has an
Interest or over which he has control. In every such instance he has
the legal right to exercise control over the crops. The spirit and substance of the Bingham Act and marketing agreement signed by the
member requires him to exercise control over his lands to the extent
of seeing that all tobacco raised thereon is marketed according to
his agreement. A failure to exercise such control in the manner indicated is a violation of his agreement."

Of further interest is the Coyle case, Coyle v. Dark Tobacco
Growers' Cooperative Association, Ky. 1925, 277 S. W. 318,
which holds, as the head-note states:
"In suit to enjoin sale of tobacco to others than cooperative tobacco
association and for damages, evidence held to show that conveyances
by husband to wife and son, though for valuable consideration, were
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fraudulent and void as to complainant In view of Ky. St. 1906, being
made for the fraudulent purpose of enabling husband to avoid contracts
made with association, of which contract and fraudulent intention
wife and son had knowledge."

These cases are referred to because they show the general
tendency of the courts of Kentucky to enable the Cooperative
to carry out its contracts and to broaden out the law along the
general lines indicated by the Legislature.
It would be interesting to discuss here the nature of cooperative contracts; the defenses urged to prevent enforcement
thereof; the attacks on the statutory provisions permitting
various kinds of relief and the protective sections directed
agaihst dealers and others who induce or permit breaches of
contract.
But these problems would necessitate and deserve separate
consideration in a separate article.
I have here simply attempted to set out that there is a
distinct trend of law affecting cooperative marketing associations, built around a recognition of a new economic development.
This law is expressed primarily in certain standard statutes,
interpreted and broadened by court decisions of many states.
A definite public policy has been announced by the legislatures and extended by the courts. This is shown in the long
series of decisions cited above and in many other cases involving
enforcement of contracts.
In the space of five years, the legislatures and courts have
made greater progress in clarifying the rights, powers and obligations of cooperatives and their members than was accomplished in the first generation of ordinary corporation development.
This is a tribute to the great importance attached to rural
problems at this time; and also to the hope that in cooperative
marketing may be found a partial solution of the difficulties
that beset the farmer.
The legislatures and the courts have let in the light. On
every important issue today connected with! cooperative marketing, the law is clear and can be found established in the decisions of courts of highest repute among the appellate courts
of our land.
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The unsettled problems are minor. Many will be determined by legislative action. Many will be determined by preponderance of decisions and by local law traditions.
But in the general story of the development of cooperative
marketing law, Kentucky will always stand at the very front,
by reason of its model statute, its cogent and widely-cited decisions and its world-famous example of commodity cooperation,
the Burley Tobacco Growers' Cooperative Association.
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